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Abstract. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) can analyze network traf-
fic for signs of attacks and intrusions. However, encrypted communica-
tion limits their visibility and sophisticated attackers additionally try
to evade their detection. To overcome these limitations, we extend the
scope of Network IDSs (NIDSs) with additional data from the hosts. For
that, we propose the integrated open-source zeek-osquery platform that
combines the Zeek IDS with the osquery host monitor. Our platform can
collect, process, and correlate host and network data at large scale, e.g.,
to attribute network flows to processes and users. The platform can be
flexibly extended with own detection scripts using already correlated,
but also additional and dynamically retrieved host data. A distributed
deployment enables it to scale with an arbitrary number of osquery hosts.
Our evaluation results indicate that a single Zeek instance can manage
more than 870 osquery hosts and can attribute more than 96% of TCP
connections to host-side applications and users in real-time.
Keywords: intrusion detection · network monitoring · host-network cor-
relation · zeek · osquery.
1 Introduction
Computer networks need a second line of defense against cyber-attacks, in which
network devices and connected systems are monitored to detect signs of intru-
sions. NIDSs can fill this gap and allow to collect extensive information about
a monitored network. They can detect ongoing attacks and compromised hosts.
However, the (definitely positive) ongoing trend towards secure and encrypted
communication, turns an IDS partially blind. It cannot analyze the encrypted
data anymore and thus might miss signs of intrusions. Furthermore, the com-
plete reconstruction of sophisticated attacks, e.g., Advanced Persistent Threats
(APTs) [7], is almost impossible based on network data only. Especially the de-
tection of multi-step attacks across multiple hosts [13] that requires to identify
related or similar flows, e.g., the Command and Control channel after a Tro-
jan download and the following lateral movement in the network, can only be
correlated with uncertainty without any insights into host data [19].
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Host context on network flows can improve the accuracy of NIDSs [14,1,5].
The combination of host and network monitoring leads to an increased visibility
on attacks and requires to jointly analyze host and network data. However, while
an NIDS can protect a complete network, a Host IDS (HIDS) has to run on
every device in the network. Moreover, this induces a high correlation load when
correlating host with network data. Furthermore, to be applicable for intrusion
detection, such a system must be able to process the data of the monitored hosts
close to real-time and thus need to scale with the number of HIDSs. Security
Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems have been designed for this
task [3]. They are centralized systems that usually read in log files collected from
NIDSs and HIDSs and perform high-level correlation and aggregations across
them. In contrast to their coarse-grained data that lacks detailed network data,
our fine-grained correlation system makes use of causal relations in the data for
the purpose of real-time intrusion detection in the network.
The main contribution of this paper is the novel open-source platform zeek-
osquery3 for the scalable and joint monitoring of networks and their hosts. For
that, we combine the network monitor and IDS Zeek [12] (formerly known as
Bro) with the host monitor osquery [6]. Our solution correlates data from the
Operating System (OS) level with network information in real-time. Further-
more, it allows to dynamically select from a great variety of OS data available
for processing. This way, we provide the fundamentals for a new class of detec-
tion algorithms that operate on a much broader visibility. We extend the context
of network flows, for example to attribute them to the originating processes and
the users that started them. Zeek-osquery can be flexibly adapted to different
detection scenarios, as osquery-hosts are directly managed from Zeek scripts and
all data processing can be implemented in Zeek. Examples are the detection of
executed files downloaded from the Internet, the detection of lateral movement
of attackers via SSH hopping [18], or to provide Zeek with Kernel-TLS keys
obtained at hosts for the decryption and inspection of network traffic.
We extensively evaluated zeek-osquery in a small-scale real-world deploy-
ment and conducted additional experiments to investigate its scalability with
an increasing number of osquery hosts. Our evaluation results indicate that we
can attribute more than 96% of all TCP connections to their originating pro-
cesses and the responsible users on monitored hosts, contrary to less than 0.1%
attributed connections when using Zeek alone. Moreover, our system seems to
scale with an increasing number of osquery hosts, enabling one Zeek instance to
handle more than 870 osquery hosts in our evaluation setting. For larger deploy-
ments, we also propose a distributed setup with multiple Zeek instances that
enable zeek-osquery to scale to arbitrarily large networks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents related
work. Section 3 highlights the concept of host-network correlation and shows
how to link host and network data for network attribution. Section 4 introduces
our open-source platform zeek-osquery to monitor both hosts and network and
to correlate monitoring data in real-time. The evaluation of zeek-osquery in
3 https://github.com/zeek/zeek-osquery
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Section 5 is done in a real-world deployment for insights and in a stress test to
highlight the scalability of our solution. We conclude with Section 6.
2 Related work
We identified four groups of related work that is relevant for our work in the
following: (1) Collaborative IDS (CIDS), (2) host context for network intrusion
detection, (3) host activity to describe communication behavior, and (4) SIEM
systems that can correlate logs from several sources.
CIDSs consist of several host or network IDSs that collect, exchange, and
analyze data to create a holistic view of a network. However, these CIDS either do
not scale, are built for a very specific purpose, e.g., to detect worm outbreaks [4],
or offer a poor detection accuracy [17].
From the perspective of a NIDS, the inclusion of environmental context can
increase the detection accuracy [15]. An early work from Snapp et al. [14] com-
bines a NIDS with remote login events from hosts to identify login chains across
multiple hosts for the same user. More recently, the context directly comes from
the communicating application. Almgren et al. [1] instruct a NIDS to verify
that the application processed the network messages correctly and to retrieve
decrypted message payloads. Dreger et al. [5] compare how the NIDS and the ap-
plication decode network messages. This allows to detect attackers that obfuscate
their traffic for IDS evasion. However, these approaches require modifications to
all applications and do not systematically correlate host and network data to
increase the network visibility in general.
To gain more insight into host activities related to network communication,
dependency graphs with processes, files, and sockets are utilized to link host
activities [8]. The objects in the dependency graph are usually created from
OS audit data [2]. For example, Ma et al. [11] taint objects in these graphs
to propagate provenance in audit logs. This allows to enrich network-related
activities on a single host, but it is not incorporated into network intrusion
detection. For the usage of dependency graphs in intrusion detection [10], King et
al. [9] extend these graphs across hosts to argue for causal relationships between
attack steps. Sun et al. [16] incorporate IDS alerts into dependency graphs linked
across hosts to find the most likely attack path through the network. However,
to the best of our knowledge, no approach systematically leverages host context
similar to dependency graphs for network intrusion detection in real-time.
SIEM systems [3] store logs from various sources, including host monitors,
host applications, and network monitors in a central storage. They correlate host
and network data to detect and investigate security incidents. However, SIEM
systems fail to detect sophisticated attacks, because they miss detailed network
data and their capabilities for analysis are usually limited to data aggregation,
thresholding, and pattern detection. In contrast, our work provides additional
host context specifically for particular network flows. It is used flexibly in Zeek
scripts for network intrusion detection in real-time. Analysis results can be writ-
ten to log files, be processed by SIEM systems, or induce an alert.
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3 Refining the network visibility
To increase the accuracy of intrusion detection, we highlight network-related
host activity that links between network and host monitoring. More generally,
we refine the network visibility by incorporating host context into network mon-
itoring. For all network traffic, we identify related properties that come from
the hosts, e.g., user or process information. In particular, we explain how to
attribute traffic in the network to applications and users on the respective hosts.
Network-related activities on hosts Throughout this paper, we use the
term flow to describe the communication between two hosts with a 5-tuple of IP
address and port of the hosts, and the protocol. We denote the flow initiator as
originator and the other host as responder. Processes, identified by a process ID
(pid), use sockets to abstract flows. A socket is identified by a unique socket ID,
i.e., the combination of a file descriptor (fd) and pid, and additionally includes
the attributes of the respective flow 5-tuple. Processes and sockets are retrieved
by monitoring the system calls (syscalls) to the kernel, e.g., as provided by the
kernel audit in Linux. Several syscalls exist for the interaction of processes with
the kernel, including execve to spawn processes as well as bind and connect
to establish incoming and outgoing flows, respectively. Another way to retrieve
processes and sockets is to probe the current kernel status of Windows, Mac,
and in particular the procfs in Linux. Kernel status data holds all attributes
about current processes and sockets.
The data from both kernel audit and kernel status come along with different
properties. While the audit allows for an asynchronous pushing of new processes
and sockets, the status has to be frequently probed and compared with the
previous one to detect any changes. Despite this probing overhead, it outperforms
the audit variant when looking at the available attributes (data soundness).
This is because audit monitors syscalls and consequently can only record actual
parameters of these calls. For example, in case of a connect, only the destination
IP address and port are part of the call. The local IP address and port remain
unknown, even when combining several socket-related syscalls. However, relying
on the status variant alone is error prone regarding retrieving all objects (data
completeness), as a short-living process or socket might start and end between
two status probes. Consequently, such processes or sockets would be missed.
Therefore, a combination of both audit and status variants is elaborated next to
achieve both full data soundness and completeness.
Attributing network flows Both the originator and the responder of a net-
work flow can be attributed by identifying the respective socket on either host,
where applicable. For simplicity, we assume that the socket identification is suffi-
cient, as this is the missing link to other host activity like processes and files [2].
The identification of the respective socket for a network flow requires a match
on the flow 5-tuple. On the originator, this is a socket representing an outgoing
flow, and an incoming flow on the responder. This is relevant as the 5-tuple for
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Fig. 1: Attributing a network flow to a process on source and destination host
by matching the network tuple to the socket information on each of the hosts.
sockets reflects the IP address and port of the local and remote hosts, while it re-
flects originator and responder host for network flow. Thus, the incoming socket
actually requires to match the inverse 5-tuple as the destination in the network
flow is required to match the local host on the responder. Figure 1 illustrates the
originator with its outgoing socket (top left), the responder with its incoming
socket (bottom right), and the network flow with its full 5-tuple (middle).
In contrast to kernel status data, the incomplete data soundness from kernel
audit results in unavailable socket attributes to match the source of a network
flow. To account for that, we correlate sockets and network flows for attribution
as following in three steps:
(1) Identify originator and responder hosts by the IP addresses in the network
flow. This requires a maintained list of IP addresses and hosts in the network.
(2) On the originator and responder, identify the socket(s) for which the flow
destination equals the remote or local socket info, respectively.
(3) Also require the flow source to equal local or remote socket info, respectively.
The correlation is unambiguous when the socket attributes for Step 3 are avail-
able. Otherwise, the correlation might be vague. In case of two hosts with a
connect syscall to the same destination IP address and port, our correlation is
still unambiguous because of Step 1. However, it is vague for the same host with
multiple flows to the same remote IP and port (from different source ports).
Ideally, the correlation outcome is exactly one socket for the originator and the
responder. However, in case of vague correlation we list all candidate hosts, pro-
cesses, and users that might be responsible for the flow.
Validity of activities Processes and sockets that already terminated some
time ago must not be considered for attribution of a currently ongoing network
flow. For that, we hold state about host activities and remove them from the
state when the respective process terminated or socket is closed. Thus, with
maintaining the host activities according to their validity in our state, we aim to
follow the life-cycle of processes and sockets from their creation to termination.
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Data from kernel status is easy to incorporate into the state, as the status
reflects a current snapshot and comparing it to the previous snapshot allows to
explicitly identify new or removed processes and sockets, respectively. For the
kernel audit, the life-cycle for processes and sockets can be followed by syscalls
like execve, socket, or close. This works as long as the process decides on its
own to terminate or to close a socket. But there will not be such an audit event
when the process crashes or the TCP connection breaks. To prevent our state
to be polluted in such cases, we regularly perform a verification of it. We do so
by probing the host if all the processes (pid) and sockets (pid, fd) in our state
are still present by the current kernel status.
4 Monitoring and event correlation with zeek-osquery
In the following, we will describe zeek-osquery, a system for the collection, anal-
ysis, and correlation of host and network data that follows the approach from
Section 3. After introducing the existing monitoring tools Zeek and osquery, we
explain how our system zeek-osquery combines these two tools for the purpose
of advanced monitoring and event correlation.
4.1 Monitoring tools and overview
The network monitoring and intrusion detection is performed by Zeek [12] (for-
merly known as Bro). It captures and parses network traffic in its core and
provides a powerful scripting language to further analyze the traffic with custom
scripts. The Zeek publish-subscribe (pub-sub) library Broker4 dispatches events
internally even among remote machines. We have enhanced Zeek to retrieve host
events from osquery hosts and to natively process them analogous to network
events in Zeek. Based on this, Zeek exposes itself as a platform with the ability
to correlate various information from both host and network events.
Osquery [6] is an OS instrumentation framework. It provides an SQL-like
interface to query the OS as a relational database, including from kernel audit
and status. SQL tables represent abstract concepts such as running processes,
open network flows, browser plugins, or file hashes. When running in background
as host sensor, osquery regularly executes SQL queries as defined in its sched-
ule. We extended osquery to communicate with Zeek via Broker to retrieve SQL
requests from Zeek and report matching host events. The flexible pub-sub com-
munication enables osquery hosts to join and leave the Broker overlay at any
time. The seamless integration of host events from osquery into the Zeek pro-
cessing pipeline allows for efficient processing of host events and their correlation
with network events directly in Zeek scripts.
In zeek-osquery, the hosts are continuously monitored by osquery, which send
host events to Zeek via the Broker overlay that connects osquery hosts and Zeek
among each other. Added or removed entries in an osquery table are retrieved
4 https://docs.zeek.org/projects/broker
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Fig. 2: Communication among osquery and Zeek.
as a continuous stream of host events. Alternatively, osquery tables can be also
queried on demand to retrieve a snapshot of an osquery table, e.g., to gather
all running processes at a certain time. This allows for an interactive analysis
of hosts, e.g., to investigate a specific security issue. Zeek acts as a correlation
platform that analyzes and correlates both, the network events for the traffic
captured by Zeek and the host events retrieved from all osquery hosts. For that,
we extended Zeek by a new Zeek framework to define custom queries and result
handling. For large deployments, our Zeek correlation platform can be set up in
a distributed manner with multiple, communicating Zeek instances.
4.2 System architecture
We implemented a novel Zeek framework, i.e., a collection of Zeek scripts, to
control osquery hosts. This way, Zeek is capable of: (1) requesting complete
results to a one-time query immediately and (2) scheduling queries that are
regularly executed. We address specific osquery hosts or groups of them in the
pub-sub overlay by distinct topic names, labeled as groups throughout this
paper. Apart from some default groups, custom ones can either be pre-configured
at the hosts or dynamically controlled by Zeek. It uses the group labels to control
the SQL queries for specific selections of osquery hosts. An interest denotes the
binding of a query to a group. It contains additional information, e.g., whether
the query is executed regularly or just once and how to send the results back to
Zeek. This way, Zeek can publish an interest over Broker to osquery hosts in a
particular group, e.g., for logged in users on all monitored servers.
When an interest is published, the currently connected osquery hosts will re-
ceive it, but others that join the overlay later missed previous but valid interests.
Thus, they would not execute the scheduled queries. For that, Zeek instances
can take over the following roles as illustrated in Figure 2:
– An Authoritative Zeek is the origin of an interest. This role defines queries
and retrieves query results, i.e., host events, from the osquery hosts.
– A Proxy Zeek collects and holds all interests from Authoritative Zeek in-
stances. It forwards only applicable queries to its directly connected osquery
hosts. The Proxy Zeek maintains the query schedule and group assignments
of hosts, both when they join and later when their interests change.
Our overlay design with respect to the Zeek roles, enables a scalable deploy-
ment with multiple Zeek instances that run in a distributed fashion for load
balancing and availability reasons. Distributing the load among multiple Zeek
instances can be achieved in three ways:
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Fig. 3: Architecture of the processing pipeline.
– Resource intensive correlation tasks can run exclusively on an additional
Authoritative Zeek instance. For that, another Zeek joins the overlay and
publishes interests for events that are required for detection. The resources of
this instance are completely available to the detection and all other instances
can continue using their resources to perform their tasks.
– If large amounts of osquery hosts would overwhelm a single Authoritative
Zeek instance, the osquery hosts are organized in groups, with one out of
multiple Zeek instances being responsible for one group. All Zeek instances
are then interested in the same query that they publish to a specific group.
– To reduce the load on a single Proxy Zeek instance, multiple instances can
be deployed. Then, each one needs to handle a lower number of directly
connected hosts that still receive the same interests as before.
After an osquery host joined the Broker overlay, it is controlled by its Proxy
Zeek and now accepts and executes any forwarded interest. However, note that
interests originally come from Authoritative Zeeks and query results should also
be routed back to them via the pub-sub overlay. For that, the originating Author-
itative Zeek by default sets the response topic to its own topic when publishing
interests. If the same interest query originates from multiple Zeeks, we suggest
to choose the same response topic across Zeek instances for the same interest.
This way, interests can be consolidated on osquery hosts and the query results
are sent efficiently over Broker to multiple Authoritative Zeek instances.
4.3 Event correlation for network attribution
We developed a processing pipeline as part of our Zeek framework to process and
correlate host and network events. We implemented it in the Zeek-typical event-
based fashion to allow custom scripts to reuse events emitted by our pipeline
for further analysis. The three different stages in the processing pipeline are
illustrated in Figure 3, follow the concept as described in Section 3, and are
detailed in the remainder of this section.
In the Querying stage interests are defined, i.e., SQL queries, that are sent to
and scheduled on osquery hosts. Events on this stage are a continuous stream of
raw host events that directly come from osquery. Incoming events reflect updates
of an osquery table, e.g., processes or sockets.
The State stage assembles raw host events from osquery to a state in real-
time and reflects the current host status, e.g., a process is added upon creation
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and removed upon termination. Tables in osquery based on Linux kernel au-
dit (cf. Section 3) report only new processes and sockets, so we verify the state
periodically against the kernel status utilizing one-time queries. The same mech-
anism is used to retrieve a snapshot for initial state before continuously updating
it with audit events. The state consolidates raw host events from different tables
in case they describe the same class of data, e.g., the socket state is built based
on the osquery tables socket events, listening ports, and process open sockets.
While state of Windows and Mac hosts is reconstructed solely from tables re-
flecting kernel status, state of Linux hosts is additionally based on kernel audit
and therefore more accurate because of data completeness (cf. Section 3).
In the Correlation stage, the data base for correlations encompasses the
triggering event and any state that is available both natively in Zeek and about
osquery hosts. As an example, we implemented the attribution of network flows
by linking them with the respective application and user in real-time. To demon-
strate the effect, we extended the statistics about every network flow in Zeek
(conn.log) to additionally list the respective host, application, and user.
4.4 Examples for Scenario Detection
Building on the network attribution (cf. Section 4.3), we implemented the detec-
tion of three particular scenarios using our processing pipeline in Zeek scripts.
Execution of mail attachments Once an email campaign with malware is recog-
nized and its mail recipients identified, it must be reconstructed who of them
executed the attachment and on which machines. Zeek-osquery tracks the exe-
cution of mail attachments as follows: First, Zeek notices a file download from
the Internet as mail attachment and remembers the file hash associated with
the attachment. Second, in parallel Zeek interactively requests the file hash of
unknown binaries upon process creations. A match among the download hashes
and the binary hashes reveals the execution of an Internet download.
Stepping Stone detection Attackers often hide their identify by using an infected
machine in the network as proxy to reach the actual target. An example for such
an attack is SSH chaining and zeek-osquery detects it as follows: First, Zeek
identifies all hosts that have both an incoming and outgoing SSH connection, i.e.,
which is an indication for a SSH proxy. To verify the relation between incoming
and outgoing connection, Zeek interactively requests the pids of all children
under the process with the incoming connection. If this list contains the pid of
the process with the outgoing connection, a stepping stone is detected.
TLS decryption TLS proxies often actively break the end-to-end encryption for
traffic analysis. With zeek-osquery, we provide the ability to selectively request
cryptographic material from hosts such that Zeek can passively decrypt the traf-
fic. As proof-of-concept, we extended osquery to capture the respective system
call used in Kernel-TLS (KTLS), when the application forwards the keys to del-
egate the symmetric de- and encryption after the TLS handshake to the kernel.
Osquery then provides a tables with the obtained keys to Zeek.
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Table 1: Characteristics of the real-world dataset.
Network flows Host events for state
Total TCP UDP ICMP Process Socket User Interface
344,366 273,241 70,929 196 2,793,406 776,910 51,719 7,919
5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate zeek-osquery. First, Section 5.1 gives insights into
a real-world deployment. Afterwards, we stress-test the system with more hosts
and host events in Section 5.2 to evaluate its scalability properties.
5.1 Real-world evaluation
We deployed zeek-osquery to monitor eleven office machines of a working group
in the computer science department on a university campus for three work-
ing days. The machines were running different Linux distributions, including
Ubuntu, Linux Mint, Fedora, and Arch Linux. To monitor their network traffic
and to correlate it with host events, we tunnel the traffic through a VPN on the
campus site that is monitored by a Zeek instance. Note, that the correlation is
performed in real-time during this experiment.
The data processed by zeek-osquery in this setup is characterized in Table 1.
It reports characteristics of the flows that our zeek-osquery ideally correlated
with host data. Furthermore, the table reports the number of received host
events. On average, each of the eleven machines was monitored for 6 hours and
21 minutes per day. An individual host on average reported 20.22 process, 5.63
socket, and 0.37 user events per minute that go into state (cf. Section 4.3). Note,
that also the initial state that is retrieved from hosts upon their (re-)connects
goes into the average event rate. The following provides results and experiences
on how zeek-osquery enhances the visibility and accuracy of monitoring.
Attribution Table 2a shows the success rate of our attribution for the 344,366
network flows in our dataset. For 96.05% of TCP connections and 86.61% of
all flows we identify the responsible processes and users. False negatives are
caused when: First, the host data is not retrieved in time for real-time correlation
with short-lived flows. Second, applications like Skype use Stateless IP/ICMP
Translation (SIIT) to embed the actual IPv4 destination address into an IPv6
address. But as the host sends an IPv4 message, this causes a mismatch between
IPv4 (in network flow) and IPv6 addresses (in host events). Third, remote hosts
continue a flow although the monitored host already left the VPN and a new
host joined the VPN reusing the same IP address. These packets cannot be
attributed to a process on the new host. The attribution rate for UDP flows is
only about 50% because Zeek retrieves host events about UDP sockets from the
audit status only (cf. Section 3), which is provided at discrete time slots only.
Thus, short-living sockets might be missed out. This holds especially true for
DNS requests that are responsible for 89% of the UDP flows.
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Table 2: Attributing of network flows.
(a) Attribution rate
All UDP TCP
86.61% 50.43% 96.05%
(b) Attribution uniqueness
Host Process User
Unique attributions 100% 88.53% 98.14%
Average candidates 1.00 1.17 1.02
We further evaluate the attributed flows with respect to a unique host, pro-
cess, and user. In Table 2b, we count the number of flows that have been at-
tributed to a single entity and furthermore calculate the average number of can-
didate entries per attribution. Apart from the vague correlation (cf. Section 3),
a fast re-usage on hosts of the same process ID or socket, i.e., file descriptor,
can be a reason for multiple attribution candidates. The effects of the vague cor-
relation become visible, especially for DNS flows. Usually applications use the
DNS server defined by the OS and therefore many processes establish flows to
the same server and port combinations. If we skip attributing flows to the DNS
servers, the unique attribution of processes increases from 88.53% to 93.15%.
Although a single user was logged in on the monitored machines, in some cases
the user attribution overlaps with a system account, e.g., in case of parallel DNS
requests by the system and an user application.
Network applications To identify communicating applications, the state-of-
the-art is to inspect network packets for application specific indicators like the
HTTP user agent. Zeek already analyses such indicators and derives the respec-
tive application, where applicable. If Zeek itself cannot derive the application
from the network packets, zeek-osquery can still verify the application via the
correlation with host data. Table 3 lists the top 10 network applications ranked
by their number of attributed flows. We observed two outcomes when comparing
both methods for identifying communicating applications: First, zeek-osquery is
able to attribute significantly more flows compared to Zeek, i.e., 298255 (86.61%)
compared to 212 (0.06%). Specifically for the Firefox browser, zeek-osquery was
able to attribute flows 2971 times more often than Zeek. Second, zeek-osquery is
able to identify applications that were not identified by Zeek. This includes user
applications such as Syncthing, Seafile, and Skype, but also system-related
components such as the network time synchronization daemon NTPD and the
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) client dhclient.
However, we have also seen limitations of zeek-osquery, especially when a
process launches another application that immediately starts a network flow.
Because the flow could have happened before or after the parent process with
the same pid transferred control with the execve syscall to the new child, both
parent and child application are candidates for the attribution. In our experi-
ment, applications that are known to never communicate directly are candidates
for 0.18% of attributed flows. Also, some monitored hosts were running NATed
Virtual Machines (VMs) with a Windows guest system. While osquery runs on
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Table 3: Top 10 attributed applications among all network flows.
Zeek zeek-osquery
Rank Attributed flows: 0.06% Attributed flows: 86.61%
1 Chrome (0.01%) Firefox (23.17%)
2 Firefox (0.01%) Thunderbird (12.30%)
3 Spotify (0.01%) Spotify (6.11%)
4 Thunderbird (0.01%) Opera (5.41%)
5 Debian APT-HTTP (<0.01%) Syncthing (5.39%)
6 libdnf (<0.01%) Chromium (4.55%)
7 Wget (<0.01%) Skype (3.87%)
8 <unknown browser> (<0.01%) Seafile (3.80%)
9 OpenSSH (<0.01%) Chrome (3.56%)
10 gvfs (<0.01%) qutebrowser (3.33%)
Total 33 applications 88 applications
the Linux hypervisor host only, it attributes any traffic of the VM to the virtu-
alization application (2.29%). However, Zeek might still identify the Windows
application inside the VM based on identifiers in the network packets (0.01%).
Zeek-osquery significantly increases the identification rate of communicating
applications. This enables to enforce the use of allowed applications and assists
threat hunters in detecting malware that covers its communication in well-known
protocols, e.g., HTTPS, that is usually allowed to pass the firewall.
5.2 Zeek performance analysis
In this section, we provide evaluation results to assess the scalability and ef-
ficiency of zeek-osquery (cf. Section 4) with an increasing number of osquery
hosts and an increasing number of events. For that, we implemented a simplified
prototype of our actual Zeek-enhanced osquery implementation in Python that
simulates new processes and sockets. Each host continuously sends four events
per second to Zeek, which is more then in our real-world evaluation.
We distribute the total amount of the lightweight osquery instances equally
among ten bare-metal machines. Zeek takes over the role of both Proxy and
Authoritative Zeek and is running on another bare-metal machine. This comes
close to a real-world deployment, in which Zeek runs on a single machine and
osquery instances are distributed on different machines in the network. All of the
machines are equipped with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2400 CPU @ 3.10GHz and
8GB of RAM. We run each configuration setup for a specific number of hosts for
20 minutes, measuring the average overhead of Zeek in terms of CPU and RAM
utilization for handling osquery hosts and processing host events in Figure 4.
During the experiment, Zeek retrieves, logs, reconstructs state, and correlates
process, socket, and user events from hosts as it is done for the attribution of
network flows. The resources scale linearly with an increasing number of osquery
hosts. A single host causes 0.11% CPU and 0.45MB RAM at the Zeek instance
during real-time correlation. Theoretically, to achieve 100% CPU utilization,
about 870 osquery hosts would be required, each sending four events per second.
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Fig. 4: Resource utilization of Zeek for hosts with four host events per second.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced zeek-osquery as a novel approach to enrich network
intrusion detection with host data. For that, zeek-osquery leverages existing OS
instrumentation to collect processes and users and correlates them with network
flows. Our open-source implementation performs efficiently in real-time and in
a scalable fashion, as different roles in the platform can be distributed. Our
system gives broader network visibility and attributes network flows to users
and applications at large scale. Compared to a network-based IDS only, e.g.,
Zeek, the ratio of attributed network flows to applications increases by orders of
magnitudes. Zeek-osquery can attribute more than 96% of the TCP connections
to the originating process and the respective users in real-time. On that basis, we
can detect malware that encrypt its communication in protocols such as HTTPS,
which usually passes a NIDS without detection. Future work can include more
host data, e.g., opened files, and can develop more correlation algorithms on top
of zeek-osquery, e.g., to detect distributed and multi-step attacks.
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